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Introduction

Economic development is contingent
on productive investment and the
financing of such productive activities
can be obtained through two
channels: via capital markets or
banks. In modern economies, these
two channels are complementary. But
the role of banks is clearly central.
Banks are key players in the financing
of economies and when their own
financial position prevents them from
performing this function, economic
growth is compromised. As McKinnon
and Shaw (1973) observed in their
seminal work on the key roles of banks
as propellants of growth and
development in developing
economies, a feeble banking system
is repressive, distortionary and disconnects the intermediation process,
thereby, precipitating macroeconomic
instability. This requires that policy
makers, as Nnanna (2005) opines,
must articulate robust policies that will
deepen the financial system to enable
banks to play their roles most
efficiently.
Banks play a prominent role in the
credit intermediation process in most
countries, providing funding to firms
beyond the cash flow provided by their
normal operations. Banks also
typically serve as custodian of a
significant portion of household
saving. Banks play a key role in
channeling credit to firms--particularly
those firms that are not able to acquire
funding from capital markets or other

sources--and also hold substantial
consumer deposits. Specifically,
banks perform a maturity
transformation function. The banking
sector is the agent for financial
intermediation, enhances financial
intermediation by mobilizing savings
(deposits) and channeling them into
productive investment in the real
sector of the economy (lending). In
other words, it performs the function
of resource allocation from surplus
units to deficit units; increase the
allocative efficiency of resources;
facilitate risk sharing spreads/
reduces risk faced by economic
agents and thereby reducing costs;
facilitates generation of wealth in the
economy; promotes productivity and
economic growth, thereby
contributing to poverty alleviation. It
also facilitates the exchange of goods
and services through the provision of
effective and efficient systems of
payments, and expands and
diversifies opportunities through
innovations.
A banking system that is in crisis
cannot therefore, carry out its
intermediation role effectively as new
lending comes to a halt, which is
known as a credit crunch. Two
mechanisms can act: low capital
adequacy ratios of banks and shortfall
of liquidity. In the first instance,
prudential rules set out the risks that
banks can take in relation to their
capital requirements. During
economic and financial downturns,
losses may appear that reduce banks'
capital; this effect may be amplified by
the accounting rules that require
certain assets to be marked to market.
In parallel, the risks, often measured
on the basis of the credit agencies'
ratings that are regularly downgraded
during crises, increase and result in
higher capital requirements. The
shortfall of liquidity results when
markets no longer function correctly.
Hence, when banks are not sure that
they can obtain financing, they stop
lending. These two “channels” could
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institutions that sheds doubt on their
solvency. This may lead to bank
failures with the associated multiple
effects. The whole system then seizes
up, and the financing of the economy
is jeopardised.
The objective of this paper is to x-ray
banking sector crisis and its resolution
options in Nigeria. The causes and
impacts of banking crisis as well as the
way forward for such crisis will also be
examined.
The paper has been divided into six
main sections. Following this
introduction, Section 2 gives the
conceptual/jurisdictional experience
of banking crisis. Section 3 gives an
overview of the structure of the
Nigerian banking sector, the causes of
banking crisis and its impacts on the
economy, while Section 4 highlights
the various banking sector resolution
options and the Nigerian experience in
banking sector crisis resolution.
Section 5 highlights the way forward,
while Section 6 concludes the paper.
2.0

Conceptual Issues/Country
Experience of Banking
Crisis

2.1

C o n c e p t u a l a n d
Definitional Considerations

The term "banking crisis" refers to a
situation of major disruptions in a
country's banking sector which may
not just be minor downturns or
disturbances. Banking crisis occurs
when the capital of the banking sector
has been depleted due to loan losses,
resulting in a negative net worth of the
banking sector. This implies that the
system is insolvent and therefore the
value of its realizable assets is less
than the total value of its liabilities. A
banking crisis can also occur from
liquidity point of view. According to
Ebhodaghe (1997), a bank is illiquid
when it can no longer meet its liabilities
as they mature for payment, which is a
breach of the contractual obligations.
Thus, banking crisis could be insolvent
but liquid; illiquid but solvent; and
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illiquid and insolvent. According to
Alashi (2002), a bank is said to be in
severe crisis when a bank shows
most or all of the following:
 Gross under-capitalization in
relation to the level and character
of business;


high level of non-performing
loans to total loans;



Illiquidity as reflected in a bank's
inability to meet customers' cash
withdrawals and/or a persistent
overdrawn of position with the
Central Bank;



Low earnings resulting in huge
operational losses; and



Weak management as reflected
by the poor asset quality, insider
abuse, inadequate internal
controls, fraud, including
unethical and unprofessional
conduct, squabbles, and a high
staff turnover, among others.

before the crisis, sharp increases in
real interest rates, and a slowdown or
reversal in capital flows. The CBN and
NDIC (2002) joint study recognized a
systemic banking crisis as when at
least two of the following situations
are present:


The banks that are critically
distressed control 20 per cent of
total asset in the industry;



15 per cent of total deposits are
threatened; and



35 per cent of the banking
system's total loans are not
performing.

2.2

The crisis could become systemic if a
sizeable number of banks in the
economy are involved, resulting in
runs on banks as depositors lose
confidence in the system and attempt
to avoid capital losses. In this case,
the country is said to be experiencing
a banking crisis. More specifically,
banking sector systemic crisis occurs
when a fairly reasonable proportion of
banks in the system are unable to
meet their obligations to their
customers, owners and the economy
as a result of weakness in their
financial, operational and managerial
conditions which have rendered them
either illiquid and/ or insolvent. It can
equally be described as those
situations where the solvency and/or
illiquidity of many or most banks have
suffered shocks that have shaken
public confidence. Examples include
the banking crises in Iceland in 2008,
Mexico in 1994, East Asian countries
after 1997, in transition economies in
the 1990s and many other developed
economies in the recent financial
crisis. In a systemic crisis, corporate
and financial sectors experience a
large number of defaults and
difficulties repaying contracts on time.
As a result, non-performing loans
increase sharply. This situation is
often accompanied by depressed
asset prices (such as equity and real
estate prices) on the heels of run-ups

Jurisdictional Experience
of Banking Crisis

A wave of banking crises has afflicted
many countries of the world in the last
two or three decades. Banking crises
have been protracted and systemic in
such countries as Argentina, Chile
and Uruguay; in Bolivia, Brazil,
Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela,
among others. In the USA, the
banking crisis of the 1930s had
devastating effects on the economy
as the American tax payers had to part
with about $160 billion to resolve the
resulting savings and loans debacle.
Some countries in Europe, Japan and
some of the Asian Tigers as well as
many other developing countries
have tasted the 'bitter pill' of banking
crisis.
A review by Lingren, Gracia and Saal
(1996) revealed that, out of the 186
current member countries of the
International Monetary Fund (IMF),
73.5 per cent or 133 have
experienced significant banking
sector problems at some stages or the
other since 1980. Two general
classes of problems were identified:
crisis (41 instances) and “significant”
problems (108 instances). The
classification referred to cases where
there were runs on banks or other
substantial portfolio shifts, collapse of
financial firms, or massive
government intervention, as crisis.
Extensive unsoundness but short of
“crisis” status was termed
“significant”. Evidently, several
countries experienced repeated
problems of either or both types.
Where the problems in banks did not
have a significant impact on either the
8

functioning of the banking sector, or
the macro-economy as a whole, as
was the case in seven of the countries
analyzed, distress was categorized
as neither “crisis” nor “significant”.
The extent or severity of distress was
measured by the size of assets or
deposits, or the number of banks
involved in distress, vis-à-vis the
industry.
The recent financial crisis that started
in 2007 has equally degenerated into
banking crisis in many developed
economies. The crisis which began
as an aftermath of the US sub-prime
mortgage led to the fall of many
financial institutions in the US
including, Indy-Mac Bank; Freddie
Mac; Fanny Mae; and UK's fifth
largest mortgage lender, Northern
Rock. It also led to the insolvency of
America's largest securities firms,
Merrill Lynch and Lehman Brothers
as well as the bankruptcy and
eventual collapse of the third largest
mortgage lender in the US which
caused the collapse of governmentbacked mortgage. With the crash of
structured-products and mortgage
market, consumer loans and
mortgage market distress led to
counter-party risk. The financial
contagion that resonated world-wide
due to the inter-linkages of the world
financial system, led to the tumbling
of stocks of all major trading markets
across Europe, Asia and other
emerging economies. As the financial
panic developed, there was a “flight to
quality as investors sought safety in
US treasury bonds, and currencies
such as the US Dollar and the Yen.”
Equity prices crashed in most
Exchanges such that the global stock
market gains of previous years were
wiped out. Some stock exchanges
were closed for days in order to avoid
a big plunge. As at end-December
2008, an estimated $14.0 trillion
share values were wiped off worldwide as many stock markets around
the globe suffered their worst 12
months of trading.
The seriousness of the economic
crisis led various governments to
initiate unprecedented financial bailouts coupled with subsequent
proposals of massive fiscal stimuli to
reverse the trend and bring the world
economies out of the doldrums. The
policies adopted varied from interest
rates cuts, bail-out packages,
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nationalization of financial institutions,
swaps arrangements, coordinated
rates cuts among central banks, etc.
In the United States for instance, as at
December 24, 2008, the Federal
Reserve had used its independent
authority to spend US$1.2 trillion
beyond the $700 billion Troubled
Asset Relief Program, (TARP)
authorized by Congress from the
federal budget on the purchase of
various financial assets and extended
emergency loans to banks, credit card
companies, as well as general
businesses. Temporary swaps of
treasury bills for mortgage-backed
securities and ban on short selling of
799 financial stocks in September
2008 were also adopted. Others
included the sale of Bear Stearns,
bailouts of American International
Group (AIG), Fannie Mae and Fredie
Mac, and Citigroup. In addition,
investment banks in the US,
converted to bank holding companies,
a status subject to more regulation,
but with readier access to government
capital.
In the Euro zone, the European
Central Bank (ECB) injected about
US$84.0 billion into the economy to
ease liquidity problem. It engaged in
coordinated rate cuts with six major
central banks (the Federal Reserves,
Bank of England, Bank of Japan,
RBA, Bank of China, and Swiss
National Bank). It also used swap
lines from the Fed to support its US
dollar operations. Other measures in
the European Union (EU) were the
agreement to increase minimum bank
deposit guarantee from 20,000 to
50,000 Euro. In individual EU member
countries, initiatives included the
German parliament approval of 500
billion Euro (US$675bn) financial
rescue package, while the French
government injected 10.5bn Euro
(US$14bn; GBP8.2.bn) into the
country's six largest banks. In the
United Kingdom, the government
directly nationalized parts of the
banking system through purchases of
equity stakes in certain banks and a
GBP300 billion rescue packages was
released to banks prompt lending by
early 2009. Banks were also
subjected to recapitalization.
Indonesia in a move adopted by
several countries reduced its
overnight repo rate, by two
percentage points to 10.25 percent.
The government introduced safety net

regulations that allowed the
government and the central bank to
quickly address financial sector
weakness.
It revised the year's
budget to reduce financing needs,
pledged to respect the free movement
of capital and also set up a task force
to manage the crisis. In addition,
insurance on bank deposits was
revised from US$10,000.00 to
US$20,000.00.
In Nigeria, to avoid being drawn deep
into the crisis, the government and
regulatory authorities took some
proactive measures. These included:


Presidential Steering Committee
on Economic Crisis



Presidential Advisory team on
capital market to deliberate on
measures to reverse the
declining trend in Nigerian
Capital market



Reduction of fees by SEC, NSE
and all capital market operators
by 50 per cent



Daily price movements
harmonized to 5 per cent either
way in October 2008



Guidelines on market makers
released by SEC



NSE reviewed trading rules and
regulations



NSE de-listed 19 moribund
companies



Share buy-back limited to 15 per
cent



Strict enforcement of NSE listing
requirements



Review of budget to cut financing
requirements



Fiscal stimulus through
drawdown from oil savings to
augment monthly revenue to
three tiers of government to
mitigate the adverse effect of
substantially lower current
revenue receipts



Cut in foreign exchange financed
expenditure e.g. overseas trips
by government officials
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The CBN, in line with global
experiences, substantially eased
monetary policy to mitigate the
negative effects of the financial
crisis on liquidity in the banking
system through a combination of
measures:
Monetary policy rate (MPR)
reduced gradually from 10.25
percent to the current 8.0 percent



Cash reserve requirement (CRR)
reduced gradually from 4.0
percent to current 1.0 percent



Liquidity ratio reduced gradually
from 40 .0 percent to current 25.0
percent

3.0

Overview of the Nigerian
Banking Sector and
Banking Sector Crisis in
Nigeria

3.1

Overview of the Structure of
the Nigerian Banking
Sector

The Nigerian financial services
industry comprises:
banking,
insurance, capital markets, pension
fund and other financial institutions.
The regulators in the sector include
the CBN, the Nigerian Deposit
Insurance Corporation (NDIC), the
Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC), the National Insurance
Commission (NAICOM), and the
National Pension Commission
(PENCOM).
As at the end of March 2010, the
operators in the industry included 24
deposit money banks (DMBs), 5
discount houses (DHs), 941
microfinance banks (MFBs), 107
finance companies (FCs), 101 primary
mortgage institutions (PMIs), 5
development finance institutions
(DFIs), 1,621 bureaux-de-change
(BDCs), 1 Stock Exchange, 1
Commodity Exchange and 73
insurance companies, about 690
stock brokers, 13 pension fund
administrators and 5 pension fund
custodians.
The banking sector in Nigeria
comprises the DMBs with 5,565
branches spread over the country and
the DHs.
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3.2

Causes of Banking Sector
Crisis

Banks are generally in the business of
borrowing short and lending long. In
doing so, they provide an essential
service (create credit) that allows the
real economy to grow and expand.
This credit creation service, however,
poses an inherent fragility in the
banking system. For instance, if
depositors are gripped by a collective
movement of distrust and decide to
withdraw their deposits at the same
time, banks would be unable to satisfy
these withdrawals as their assets are
illiquid thereby leading to liquidity
problem. In normal times, when
people have confidence in the banks,
these crises do not occur. But
confidence can quickly evaporate, for
example, when one or more banks
experience a solvency problem due to
non-performing loans. Bank runs are
then possible. A liquidity crisis erupts
that can also bring down sound
banks. The latter become innocent
bystanders that are hit in the same
way as the insolvent banks by the
collective movement of distrust.
Sound banks that are hit by deposit
withdrawals have to sell assets to
confront these withdrawals. The
ensuing fire sales lead to declines in
asset prices, reducing the value of
banks' assets. This in turn erodes the
equity base of the banks and leads to
a solvency problem. The cycle can
start again: the solvency problem of
these banks ignites a new liquidity
crisis and so on.
All banking crises are different even if
they share a number of common
characteristics. Generally speaking,
they follow a period of significant
credit expansion and a sharp rise in
stock market and/or property prices in
a largely self-sustained mechanism.
With the increase in value of assets
that may be used as collateral for
loans is used to secure new loans,
even if the intrinsic economic
justification of the new loans is not
uncertain. Any external shock that
calls into question the value of these
assets reveals the poor quality of
these loans and the crisis erupts.
Losses reduce the banks' capital and
the most exposed banks become
insolvent. While doubts persist over
the extent and the distribution of the
losses, the markets become totally
illiquid.

Apart from the above scenario, one
major cause of banking crisis is
macroeconomic instability. Goldstein
and Tunrner (1986) noted that
macroeconomic volatility can cause
banks to be vulnerable if it alters the
relationship between the values of
bank assets and liabilities. A study by
Brownbridge (1998) revealed that
periods of high inflation occurred in all
the four countries covered in the
study. He noted that a high inflation
rate was largely responsible for the
volatility of business profits because
of its unpredictability, coupled with a
high degree of variability in the rate of
increase of the prices of particular
goods and services which constituted
the overall price index. This
observation underscores factors of
adverse selection and poor incentives
for borrowers to take risks and
inevitably, accounts for the high
probability of loan default. In addition,
a high inflation rate makes loan
appraisals very difficult for banks,
especially as the viability of potential
borrowers depends on unpredictable
developments in inflation, exchange
and interest rates.
A dramatic increase in uncertainty in
the banking sector, due largely to the
failure of a prominent bank or nonfinancial institution, a recession,
political instability, rumors of instability
in the sector or a stock market crash,
makes it difficult for lenders to
separate good from bad risks. The
rise in uncertainty therefore is capable
of making information in the banking
sector even more asymmetric and
may worsen the adverse selection
problem and these will make lenders
unwilling to lend thereby precipitating
to a decline in lending, investment and
aggregate economic activity. A typical
example is that of Northern Rocks. A
news flash by the British Broadcasting
Corporation indicating that the bank
had approached the Bank of England
for a facility under the last resort
created a run on the bank that
eventually led to the failure of that
bank.
Poor risk management procedures,
ignorance and non-compliance with
rules, laws and regulations, technical
incompetence, violation of
regulations, policies, procedures
guidelines, unhealthy competition
and weak internal controls and
operational procedures lead to
10

banking crisis. Banks that have
proper risk management and internal
controls as well as a well focused
strategic objective are likely to
operate normally even in the face of
turbulent situation.
We a k c o r p o r a t e g o v e r n a n c e ,
particularly insider abuse and
contravention of supervisory
regulatory provisions and
overbearing directors' interest in
loans and advances or any credit
facilities are major causes of banking
crisis, especially in a developing
country like Nigeria. A study
conducted by the Research
Department of the Bank revealed that
in one of the then distressed banks in
Nigeria, four of the erstwhile bank's
directors abused their privileges and
breached their fiduciary duties by
engaging in several activities to the
detriment of the bank's depositors
and other stakeholders. Specifically,
they obtained insider loans that
constituted about 520 per cent of the
bank's total risk assets or about 50.5
per cent of the total loans and
advances when the bank was
liquidated in 1998.
Overtrading, assets mismatch and
excessive risk taking indicating high
loan to deposits ratio are significant
causes of banking crisis. If a bank's
core deposits are short-tenored and it
engages in unbridled lending,
particularly long-term lending, the
tendency for the bank to go into
insolvency is there. This is a case of
assets mismatch. Overtrading could
imply that a bank is giving out loans
without taking into consideration of
the amount it would be used in settling
its daily and future commitments.
Ownership structure of a bank has a
direct bearing to its survival. The
overbearing influence of a particular
director on the board and
management of a bank could result in
frequent boardroom crisis and the
breakdown of internal controls
precipitating to banking crisis and
may eventually lead to the failure of
the bank.
The role of management in the
effective performance of a bank is
critical. Poor management is one of
the principal factors that could
precipitate banking crisis. Board
s q u a b b l e s ; i n e ff e c t i v e b o a r d
oversight functions; poor leadership
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and administrative ability; as well as
fraudulent and self-serving practices
among board members, management
and staff have been attributed as one
of the causes of bank failures.
Besides, recruitment and placement
of fit and proper persons in the
management of a bank as well as the
integrity and transparency of its
management will definitely impact
positively on the performance of a
bank. On the other hand, a bank with
poor quality staff and management
and engages in non-publication and
non-disclosure of accounts and other
performance indices can lead to poor
performance and eventual demise of
a bank.
Moreover, banks are susceptible to
the risk of contagion, owing to their
financial inter-relationships through
lending and borrowing from each
other, holding of deposit balances with
each other and through the
payments/clearing system. Banking
crisis could erupt from bank(s) having
exposures with other local banks or its
foreign affiliate and correspondent
bank(s). Though banks generally
need to work in tandem with other
local and foreign banks for their
smooth functioning, the exposure that
such dependence imposes should be
limited and secured. This is because
the impact of the poor performance of
one or more of the banks in the system
arising from bank-related distress
may negatively affect the operations
and activities of other sound banks in
the system, leading to systemic
problem.
On the foreign front, the excessive
dependence of one bank on a foreign
bank for its operations poses a
significant to the survival of the bank in
particular and sector in general. For
instance, at the advent of the
consolidation exercise in the Nigerian
banking sector, many Nigerian banks
had correspondent relationships with
foreign banks. But when the global
financial crisis set in, many of the
credits earlier granted to the domestic
banks were recalled and most of the
local banks recorded some losses as
some of the foreign banks were
affected negatively.
Gross under-capitalization constitutes
another source of banking crisis.
Banking sector soundness and its
susceptibility to shocks largely

depend on the adequacy of its
capitalization. Provisioning for bad
loans and other unforeseen losses
are absorbed by robust capital, while
poor capitalization would lead to the
folding up of a bank should the risk of
default crystalises.
Financial reforms actually would lead
to a more competitive market, but at
the same time may lead to an
increase in the failure rates of banks
and other financial firms. Under stiff
competition, banks will normally
respond to higher competition and a
shrinking customer base by charging
lower rates on loans. With increasing
competition in the deposit market,
banks' funding costs may rise
because they have to pay higher rates
to attract deposits from competitors.
As revenues decrease and costs rise,
lending margins shrink as monopoly
rents are competed away. Poorly
performing institutions will see their
economic capital eroded, and they
could face the prospect of closure by
banking regulators.
3.3

Impact of Banking Sector
Crisis on the Economy

As alluded to earlier, a healthy
banking system generally contributes
to strong economic growth, while
banking crisis can present a
substantial drag on the real economy
as it reduces the amount of financial
intermediation undertaken and
consequently a decline in investment
and aggregate economic activity in
the economy. By the nature of their
business, banks tend to be highly
leveraged and incur a mismatch in the
maturity of assets and liabilities,
which make them susceptible to
deposit runs. Banks' intermediation
function entails that they link most
sectors of the economy. Hence, on
one hand, banking sector difficulties
have an effect outside the banking
sector, and on the other, shocks to any
one sector are reflected in bank
performance and can be transmitted
through the banking system
throughout the economy. For
instance, the fall in the price of oil has
affected the banks indirectly. Banking
crises intensify slowdown in
economic activities, prevent loanable
funds from being allocated to their
most productive uses, reduce the
availability and increase the cost of
funds to small and medium-size
11

businesses and seriously constrain
the conduct of monetary policy, among
others. In developing economies, like
Nigeria, banks are the major
participants in the financial systems.
They operate the payments system,
provide liquidity to fledging securities
markets and are major purchasers of
government securities. Given the
major role of banks in these
economies, it is easy to conclude that
the collapse of the banking system
causes serious negative externalities
for the rest of the economy. These
externalities take various forms.
Bank failures are usually followed by
government bailouts. Fiscal costs of
banking crises include costs of
restructuring the banking system,
considering the payments to
depositors, bank recapitalization
bonds, and asset management
schemes. The fiscal gross direct costs
are measured as outlays of the
government and central bank in terms
of bond issuance and disbursements
for liquidity support, payout of
guarantees on deposits, costs of
recapitalization, and purchase of nonperforming loans. Net costs to the
public sector are estimated as the
deduction from gross costs of
recoveries from the sale of assets and
equity stakes and repayment of debt
by recapitalized entities (Hoelscher
and Quintyn, IMF 2003). The public
money that is needed to recapitalize
insolvent banks puts pressure on the
budget deficit to increase.
In addition, poorly enforced banking
crisis resolution may engender moral
hazard on the part of bank borrowers
and bank managers. The fiscal burden
created through banking crises and
any fiscal bail-out of the financial
system reduces the resources
available for government programs
that are of greater intrinsic social
value, and can give rise to all sorts of
economic, political and social
problems when the time arrives to face
the costs. The bailout, of course,
intensifies the moral hazard problem
in the future, due to the fact that future
depositors have less incentive to
monitor the activity of banks thereby
discouraging saving in the domestic
banking system, especially where
depositors had incurred losses from
the failure of banks.
Financial sector crisis has often been
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associated with reductions in output
and other macroeconomic
disturbances, as evidenced by the
recent global financial crisis. A
banking crisis may lead to a fall in
output through a sharp contraction in
the stock of money (monetary
channel), through the decline in credit
supply (credit channel) and also by
the “idling” of resources that result
from bankruptcies, judiciary
procedures and seizure of collateral.
Furthermore, a breakdown in the
payments system would imply severe
costs.
A banking crisis also influences the
conduct of monetary policy. The
monetary authorities need to supply
the banking system with liquidity
during a period of crisis. Banks
cannot service their loans and need
funds to pay their creditors
(depositors). They look at the central
bank, as the lender of last resort, to
provide them with the needed funds.
But, central banks must also be
concerned about conducting a
monetary policy that provides price
stability and promotes growth making
the situation a difficult one for the
conduct of effective monetary policy.
Banking crises pose devastating
effects to many of the weakest sectors
in the economy that are “credit
intensive:” such as housing,
agriculture, and small and medium
size enterprises. These sectors
constitute the highest employer of
labour in the economy and so any
adverse effect on them will have a
multiplier effect on the economy as a
whole, particularly in the area of
employment. Moreover, the banking
system, particularly in a developing
economy like Nigeria, the banking
sector is the greatest employer of
labour aside agricultural sector. A
crisis in the sector would translate to
more joblessness in the economy.
Furthermore, during a banking crisis,
the quality of available information
worsens, and that intensifies the
adverse selection problem and given
that several firms experience a
decrease in their creditworthiness,
due to their inability to pay back their
loans, there is a high chance that
funds will be directed to inefficient
firms because these are the ones that
are willing to pay the higher interest
rates. As a consequence, the quality

of investment is likely to suffer after a
banking crisis has occurred.
Also, a banking crisis normally leads
to erosion of public confidence in the
sector and hence a decline in banking
habit. In a country like Nigeria where
much effort had been directed to
propagate banking habit in the
banking public, an erosion of
confidence in the banking sector
could be a critical one for the nation as
it would create distortions in the
economy.
Banking crises in emerging
economies may have significant
negative spillover effects on industrial
economies and vice versa. The
reason is that the importance of
emerging economies in the world
economy and in international financial
markets has grown in recent years.
Most developing economies import a
lot from the developed world. At the
event of financial crisis in the
emerging economies, there is bound
to be weak demand for imported
goods hence a production slowdown.
The current financial crisis is a typical
case where produced goods in the
developed countries are being
auctioned at buy 2 and get one free.
In the Nigerian context, the effects of
the Global financial crisis include
lower demand for Nigeria's exports,
particularly crude oil, whose price has
been on the decline since the crisis.
Oil constitutes 25 per cent of our GDP;
99 per cent of exports; and 80 per cent
of government revenue. At least 40
per cent of Nigeria's trade is with the
US. There is the likelihood of lower
commodity prices, for non-oil exports.
In addition, there are more job losses,
especially in the capital market, while
inflationary pressure has resurfaced
with the attendant reduced
confidence in business environment.
All these have resulted in government
revenue contraction; deaccumulation of foreign reserves;
pressures on exchange rate; limited
foreign trade finances for banks as
credit lines dry-up for some banks;
divestment by foreign investors in the
Nigerian capital market with the
attendant tightness and possible
feedback effects on the balance sheet
of banks; and counter-party risks visà-vis external reserves, however, the
CBN has taken measure to safeguard
the reserves.
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Long run costs of banking crisis
include low savings rates, very limited
long term financial relationships,
reliance on external financing, high
interest rate spreads, dollarization
and a heavy public sector debt
burden. Under these conditions of
“short-termism” and low
intermediation, deposit withdrawals
translate quickly into credit
contractions, which may further
worsen the situation as firms are
starved of working capital and
investment is constrained.
Furthermore, the country becomes
more dependent on inflows of foreign
capital to finance investment or
government. Hence, the probability
and expected severity of a banking
crisis increase, which reinforces the
tendency towards low domestic
savings.
Once a system has experienced a
banking crisis, several mechanisms
may perpetuate vulnerability. A crisis
may not only have reputational
effects, but also forces banks to
charge high interest spreads to
rebuild capital and reserves, or to pay
for emergency lending from the
central bank and deposit insurance
payouts. If there has been a bail-out
with public funds, fiscal sustainability
may be threatened, and therefore
savers and investors will be
discouraged by the prospect that a
debt crisis will spill over in to the
banking system, or be resolved
through a new round of hyperinflation
or deposit conversion.
4.0

Banking Sector Crisis
Resolution Options and
the Nigerian Experience

4.1

Banking Sector Crisis
Resolution Options

The policy options available in a
banking crisis are sensitive to the type
and size of shock affecting the
financial system, in particular,
whether failures are thought
systemic. If the situation is nonsystemic, the focus of the resolution is
on the individual failed bank's balance
sheet. In this case the failed bank will
either be merged with a healthy bank
or liquidated. In a systemic situation,
however, the immediate aim of the
authorities is usually to restore
financial stability of the system as a
whole, restore public confidence and
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avoid bank runs. Here guarantees are
likely to be given to liability holders at
the failed bank(s), and perhaps to the
financial system as a whole to avoid or
reduce panic. So the aim is first to
stabilise the liabilities of the banking
system, before restructuring the
assets of the failing banks.
There is a range of options for
resolving insolvent banks. At one
extreme, a bank can be kept open
through an injection of capital. At the
other extreme, a bank can be closed
with its assets sold and depositors and
possibly other creditors paid off.
Between these extremes, a bank's
licence may be removed but with the
bank sold off to another bank, in full or
part, to preserve the bank's activities.
The extent of involvement of the
authorities may also vary. It may be
limited to encouraging or organising
private sector support, or extended to
official financial support, in the limit
through government takeover. When
a bank is financially distressed there
should be a preference, first, to
encourage a private sector solution. If
an unassisted private sector solution
cannot be found, a decision would
next be made about whether to
liquidate the bank or provide some
form of government assistance. In
exceptional circumstances, if there
were a systemic threat, governments
might consider a takeover or
guarantee to a failed bank, as an
interim measure.
These options are reviewed below in
turn.
4.1.1 Unassisted Resolution
Options
Bank status unchanged
When a bank supervisor discovers
that a bank is at, or close to, the point
of insolvency, the first response is to
see whether the bank can be
rehabilitated without government
assistance. There are often several
steps here. The bank can be
instructed to curtail lending, either in a
specific line of business or across the
board. A request (demand) for
additional capital from existing
shareholders or other interested
parties is often issued; management
changes can be required; and
operational changes are almost
always undertaken.

Bank status changed private
sector merger
If a capital infusion from existing
shareholders or other interested
parties is not available, an unassisted
merger with another healthy financial
institution is usually the next course of
action. For an unassisted merger to
occur, the extent of losses must be
transparent to the prospective
acquirer. Therefore, supervisors
should examine the troubled bank to
determine the size of losses to ensure
that the acquiring institution has
sufficient capital to absorb potential
losses in the failing institution.
4.1.2

Liquidation Option

If an unassisted private sector merger
is not possible, a decision is often
made to liquidate the bank. In
liquidation, the bank is declared
insolvent, closed, and depositors paid
off. The restructuring authority then
liquidates all assets. In most cases
uninsured depositors and other
creditors are only covered if sufficient
funds are available after liquidation.
Liquidation exerts a strong financial
discipline on the various
stakeholders. But when liquidation
occurs, it may affect other banks
through direct exposures or changes
in financial market prices. In addition,
reimbursing depositor and creditor
claims, from the sale of the failed
bank's assets, can be a long and
disruptive process that locks up
people's wealth for months or even
years and has knock-on effects
throughout the economy.
4.1.3

Assisted Resolutions

If some form of government
intervention is considered, various
forms are available:
Bank status unchanged
Lender of last resort (LOLR)
Central banks usually only provide
emergency liquidity assistance in
potentially systemic situations and
only for a limited period. Liquidity
support to individual institutions can
buy time to assess the underlying
solvency position and to assess
alternative resolution strategies.
Although LOLR is intended for illiquid
but fundamentally solvent banks, in
practice it may be difficult, in the time
available, to distinguish between a
13

liquidity and a solvency problem.
Mechanisms should be put in place to
ensure that such lending is timelimited and conditional, and that the
central bank protects itself from
incurring losses, in particular through
taking collateral.
Open bank assistance
This occurs when the government
provides financial assistance to a
distressed bank without taking the
bank over or eliminating the current
stockholders' position entirely. The
assistance can be in the form of the
provision of capital or through
purchasing non-performing assets
from the bank. This allows the
operations of the bank to continue
uninterrupted. However, there are
potential weaknesses with open bank
resolutions. Most important, if the
bank's management is left in place,
and the existing shareholders'
investment protected, this will
seriously increase moral hazard.
Making government support
conditional can reduce this problem,
for example, through replacing
management, eliminating or
downgrading existing shareholders'
interests, or mandating an infusion of
private sector capital. Open bank
assistance has often required
repeated capital injections before
problems have been solved, resulting
in large fiscal costs of resolution.
Bank status changed
Assisted Merger or Acquisition
Resolution of a bank failure often
involves an assisted merger or
acquisition. The transaction can be
completed with another bank or, if
permitted by law, another type of
institution. A merger provides
business continuity for both borrowers
and depositors. It can be structured in
many different ways, depending on
the size and complexity of the
distressed bank, the funding
constraints of the resolution authority,
and the amount of time until failure.
Banks can also be split up, with the
deposits, branches and assets sold off
separately.
Assisted mergers are sometimes
accomplished using Purchase and
Assumption model (P&A). In an
assisted P&A, the acquirer purchases
the assets and assumes the liabilities,

January - March 2010

Volume 34, No. 1
in whole or part, of the failed bank,
with the resolution authority
compensating for the difference.
Here, existing shareholders lose all of
their investments. Uninsured
creditors, too, may lose part of their
investment if the P&A is only partial.
Bridge Banks
This is a form of temporary
government ownership. A number of
industrialised countries with systemic
crises, such as Finland and Sweden,
have assumed temporary ownership
of troubled large banks, to permit
restructuring and subsequent sale to
a private institution. Bridge banks
offer a holding period so that a final
resolution strategy can be effected.
While the government can maintain
the business operation of the bank,
the set time period forces the
resolution authority to focus on
cleaning up the bank's balance sheet
in preparation for selling it.
Outright Government Ownership
This has typically occurred when a
very large bank fails. The government
authorities take over the bank by
nationalising it, usually eliminating the
stockholders' interest but protecting
depositors and other creditors. One
problem with outright nationalisation,
however, is that government
managers do not have the same
incentives as private bank managers.
In market economies, private sector
banks are essential for efficiently
allocating credit. Evidence suggests
that countries with higher shares of
state-owned banks tend, on average,
to have a higher share of nonperforming loans and higher
operating costs (Goldstein and Turner
(1996)).
4.2

The Nigerian Experience

Two broad types of resolution options
have been adopted in Nigeria so far
by the regulatory/supervisory
authorities:
Outright liquidation (deposit pay-out)
and the Purchase and Assumption
(P&A) options (assisted mergers and
acquisitions). Other resolution
options adopted in Nigeria will also be
discussed.
Outright Liquidation (deposit payout):

Under this option, the entire assets
and liabilities of the affected bank are
placed under the control of the
liquidator (NDIC) who would arrange
to physically close the bank. NDIC
then verifies the assets and liabilities
of the bank and exercises control over
all its moveable assets. Under
Nigeria's deposit insurance scheme,
each customer's account is insured
up to a maximum N200.0 (two
hundred thousand naira). In 1998, 26
banks with 347 branches spread over
32 states and Abuja were closed
down and faced liquidation under the
NDIC. Some of them were Financial
Merchant Bank (FMB), Kapital
Merchant Bank (KMB), Alpha
Merchant Bank (AMB), United
Commercial Bank (UCB), Republic
Bank (RBL), CCB, PBN, Mercantile
Bank etc
Purchase and Assumption (P&A)
Model
The basic characteristics of this
option is the purchase of the whole or
part (cherry-picking) of the assets of a
failed bank by a healthy (assuming)
bank and the assumption of the
deposit liabilities of the failed bank by
the same bank. The P&A 0ption has
featured prominently in the history of
bank failure resolution in Nigeria.
Following the conclusion of the bank
consolidation exercise at endDecember 2005, 13 banks that failed
to make it were handed over to the
NDIC for liquidation. The P&A model
has since been adopted by the
Corporation for their liquidation. As at
end-December 2009, 11 out of the 13
affected banks had been assumed by
some healthy banks. These include
Allstate, Hallmark (Eco bank); trade,
Metropolitan, City Express, African
Express, Gulf, Liberty (UBA); Lead,
Assurance (Afribank); and Eagle
(Zenith). The cases of Triumph and
Fortune International banks are still
pending in the court.
Other bank resolution options
adopted in Nigeria included:
CBN Bail-out Using Guarantees
This option was applied by the CBN
during the late 1990s for some of the
ailing banks. For instance, at the
inauguration of one of the affected
bank's new board and management,
the CBN gave a commitment that it
was fully behind the bank and would
14

honour all cheques drawn on it.
Further guarantees were given to
other healthy banks, which enabled
those banks to provide life-boat
facilities to the affected banks.
Unfortunately, this option did not stop
the run on these banks.
CBN/NDIC Controlled
Restructuring (Open bank
assistance)
This option implies taking over the
board and management of a bank by
the CBN and NDIC in order to
restructure the bank and run it
profitably. The hope is that the cream
of professionals selected jointly by
the CBN and NDIC would be able to
turn the bank around within a short
period of time and return the bank to
the owners. This was variously used
by the Bank in the late 1990s and
recently when about eight (8) banks
had problems. In most cases, this
option worked out as some of the
affected banks were resuscitated,
while in other cases the resuscitation
efforts proved abortive. In most of the
failed cases, the banks had
forwarded falsified financial reports to
the regulatory authorities to cover up
its fraudulent practices which were
already beyond redemption.
4.3

The current Banking
S e c t o r C r i s i s
Resolution/Pre-emptive
Actions by the Regulatory
Authorities

The global financial crisis strained the
progress made in the sector. The
industry experience in the face of the
global meltdown is, however,
consistent with global trends.
Specifically, a section of the banking
industry was badly affected and
liquidity problem was precipitated
following its significant exposure to
the capital market in form of margin
trading loans. Again, in the wake of
the high oil prices, a section of the
industry was badly exposed to the oil
and gas sector. These excessive
exposures resulted in the
weaknesses (liquidity problems)
exhibited by some of the banks
towards the end of 2008.
A joint special examination
(CBN/NDIC) of 10 out of the 24 banks
as at May 31, 2009 revealed that
some of the banks exhibited the
following symptoms:
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Substantial non-performing loan;



Poor corporate governance
weaknesses in governance and
management;
Weaknesses in capital adequacy;
and




illiquidity problem

It was against this background that the
CBN moved decisively to strengthen
the industry, protect depositors and
creditors, and restore public
confidence and safeguard the
integrity of the Nigerian banking
industry.
In this regard, it replaced the chief
executives/executive directors of the
banks identified as the source of
instability in the industry and injected
the sum of N620.0 billion in to the
banks in an effort to prevent a
systemic banking crisis. The injection
of this fund (Tier II capital) into these
banks is considered sufficient to
resolve and stabilize them to enable
them to continue normal business
operations. Arrangements have been
made to recover non-performing
loans from the banks' debtors while
guaranteeing all foreign credits and
correspondent banking commitments
of the five banks.
Other Recent Policy Actions to
Strengthen the Reform Process
The CBN commenced the creation of
Asset Management Corporation. The
draft Bill for the establishment of
Assets Management Corporation of
Nigeria (AMCON) has already been
passed into law by the National
Assembly. The AMCON as a
resolution vehicle is expected to soak
the toxic assets of the CBNintervened banks and provide liquidity
to them as well as assist in their
capitalization.
Furthermore, the Bank in
collaboration with the fiscal authorities
is improving the macroeconomic
environment so as to achieve robust
monetary and financial policies in
particular and, the overall
macroeconomic objectives of the
government, in general. In this regard,
the Bank is collaborating with the
Federal Government to raise N500.00
billion for power/infrastructure
development. This is expected to
provide favorable environment that
would encourage operators in the

industry. In addition, N200.00 billion
has recently been provided wholly by
the CBN for SMEs financing.
It is also collaborating with the
Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) and the Nigerian
Stock Exchange (NSE) to reduce the
cost of transactions, particularly bond
issues so as to diversify funding
sources away from banks as well as
attract more foreign portfolio investors
into the sector.
Efforts are also being intensified
towards strengthening regulatory and
supervisory framework and
enhancing monitoring of the
operations of the Deposit Money
Banks (DMBs) to ensure that they
remain safe, sound and healthy. In
addition, these efforts will also ensure
the maintenance of public confidence
through the enforcement of
appropriate disclosures and
reinvigorating the policy of zero
tolerance on all unprofessional and
unethical banking practice, and
greater emphasis on enforcement of
Code of Corporate Governance.
Standby teams of target examiners
are being deployed to any bank at any
time to ensure timely regulatory
actions, if necessary.
To further engender public confidence
in the banking system and enhance
customer protection, the CBN
established the Consumer and
Financial Protection Division to
provide a platform through which
consumers can seek redress. In the
first three months of its operation,
about 600 consumer complaints were
received by the Division which was a
manifestation of the absence of an
effective resolution mechanism in
banks. The CBN has also issued a
directive to banks to establish
Customer Help Desks at their head
offices and branches. In addition, the
CBN has commenced a
comprehensive review of the Guide to
Bank Charges with a view to making
the charges realistic and consumer
friendly. Furthermore, the Consumer
and Financial Protection Division is
expected to commence a programme
of consumer education and
enlightenment and is also
collaborating with the Consumer
Protection Council on the review of
the Consumer Protection Council Act
No. 66 of 1992 to regulators to enforce
15

discipline in the market.
The CBN has taken steps to integrate
the banking system into the global
best practices in financial reporting
and disclosure through the adoption of
the International Financial Reporting
Standards (IFRS) in the Nigerian
Banking Sector by end 2010. This is
expected to enhance market
discipline, and reduce uncertainties
which limit the risk of unwarranted
contagion. The CBN is also, closely
collaborating with other stakeholders
like the Nigerian Accounting Standard
Board (NASB), Federal Ministry of
Finance (FMF), NDIC, SEC, and
NAICOM; PENCOM, Federal Inland
Revenue Service (FIRS), and Institute
of Chartered Accountant of Nigeria
(ICAN), among others, towards
ensuring a seamless adoption of IFRS
in the Nigerian banking sector by
2012. These efforts are being pursued
under the aegis of the Roadmap
Committee of Stakeholders on the
Adoption of IFRS in Nigeria
inaugurated by the NASB and
facilitated by the World Bank.
The universal banking (UB) model
adopted in 2001, allowed banks to
diversify into non-bank financial
businesses. Following the
consolidation programme, banks
became awash with capital, which was
deployed in multiplicity of financial
services. In effect, the laudable
objectives of the UB Model were
abused by operators with banks
operating as financial supermarkets to
the detriment of core banking
practices. To address the observed
challenges, the CBN is reviewing the
UB Model with a view to directing
banks to focus on core banking
business. Under the new model,
banks would not be allowed to invest in
non-bank subsidiaries, while banks
with such investments would be
required to either divest or spin-off the
businesses to holding companies that
will be licensed by the CBN as other
financial institutions. The three
classes of deposit money banks being
proposed are: International banks,
National banks, and Regional banks.
Other measures included: the
strengthening of institutional
coordination through the Financial
Service Regulation Coordinating
Committee (FSRCC), adoption of
common accounting year end for all
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banks, aimed at improving data
integrity and comparability;
conducting own-risk assessments
and relying less on classifications by
rating agencies; limiting the tenor of
Chief Executives of Banks to 10
years;; sound and timely regulation
and supervision of the financial
sector;
stringent demand for
transparency in the financial sector;
and transparency in structured credit
instruments to be improved upon for
easy assessment of associated risk.
The Alpha Project Initiatives of the
CBN
The Central Bank of Nigeria has
articulated a blue print for reforming
the Nigerian financial system in
general and the banking sector in
particular in the next ten years. The
blue print is built on 4 pillars of
enhancing the quality of banks,
establishing financial stability,
enabling healthy financial sector
evolution and ensuring that financial
sector contributes to the real
economy. The details are as follows:


Enhancing the quality of banks

The CBN would initiate a five-part
programme to enhance the
operations and quality of banks in
Nigeria, which would consist of
industry remedial programmes to fix
the key causes of the crisis,
implementation of risk based
supervision, reforms to regulations
and regulatory framework, enhanced
provision for consumer protection and
internal transformation of the CBN
which has commenced.


Establishing Financial Stability

This would centre on strengthening
the Financial Stability Committee
within the CBN and establishing a
hybrid monetary policy and macroprudential rules. It would also include
the development of directional
economic policy and counter-cyclical
fiscal policies by the government and
further development of capital market
as alternative to bank funding. Some
of the potential levers for the new
macro-prudential rules may include
limiting capital market lending to a
proportion of a bank's balance sheet,
prohibiting banks from using
depositors' funds for proprietary
trading, private equity or venture
capital investment, adjusting capital

adequacy and forward looking capital
requirement driven by stress tests by
the CBN.


Enabling healthy Financial
Sector Evolution

The CBN would review the basic onesize-fits-all model of banking in
addition to reviewing the universal
banking model mandates which
would make it possible to have
international, national, regional,
monoline and specialized banks such
as Islamic banks, etc, with different
capital requirements, commensurate
to the depth of their activities.


Ensuring the Financial Sector
Contributes to the Real
Economy

This would entail leveraging on the
CBN Governor's role as Adviser to the
President on Economic Matters to
ensure that the financial sector
contributes to the real economy. The
CBN would take the lead in measuring
more accurately the relationship
between the real economy and
f i n a n c i a l s e c t o r, a s w e l l a s
cooperating with state governments
to run pilot programmes in directing
the financial sector's contribution to
social and economic development
within the states.
Furthermore, the CBN intends to be
announcing an advance calendar of
its operations for each week so that
market expectations are formed in a
manner that is conducive to the
realization of the objectives of policy.
The Bank also proposes to have in
place firm consultation procedures
with bank executives, prior to and
after the policy meetings as a
condition for bringing about a more
open and transparent monetary
policy. The CBN is putting in place a
code of conduct for regulators to
ensure that regulatory and
supervisory staff in the financial
services sector live up to the high
expectation, thereby reducing various
types of risks in both their domestic
and international operations.
5.0

The Way Forward

Maintaining a safe and sound banking
sector is essential, given the key role
that banks play in promoting the
health of a country's overall economy.
Most countries do this by some form
16

of banking supervision, generally
accepting that the added protection to
the banking system in the form of
supervision is worth the costs of the
regulatory burden. One of the ways
that bank supervisors can help
promote a healthy banking system is
to focus banks on the development of
improved risk-management
techniques.
Indeed, identifying, assessing, and
promoting sound risk-management
practices have become central
elements of good supervisory
practice. Bankers should therefore
ensure that their risk-management
practices include a focus on less likely
outcomes, not just the most common
ones, and that the bank is being
adequately compensated
(provisioning) for the risk it is bearing.
The use of exercises such as stress
tests and scenario analyses can help
bankers identify certain points of
vulnerability that may arise during
potential downturns.
To arrest banking crisis, there is need
to strengthen banks' capital
requirements in order to ensure their
solvency. This is achieved via the
purchasing by public authorities of
securities issued by banks or by
taking stakes, where necessary, in
troubled banks. Banks will thus be
able to continue developing their
lending activities, by increases in their
capital, even if adverse market
conditions prevent them from raising
funds on financial markets.
Another type of action consists in
ensuring the proper provision of
liquidity to banks by the monetary
authorities so that they can continue
to finance the economy in the shortand long-term. Central banks have
regularly adjusted their operational
frameworks in order to provide the
banking systems with all the liquidity
that they need: The discount window
operations was recently extended in
order to give renewed impetus to the
money market beyond the very shortterm segment. The money market
transaction thus was considerably
strengthened. The range of eligible
counterparties was extended to
enable the maximum diffusion of
liquidity in the system; the scope of
eligible collateral for refinancing was
enlarged to provide more flexible
access and make larger quantities
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available; in the system the
refinancing potential of counterparties
was thus almost doubled; the
refinancing procedures were also
radically modified: quantities are no
longer limited and are agreed at a
fixed rate (instead of a system of
variable rates via auctions).
It has been noted that better risk
management and stronger financial
buffers alone cannot prevent higherrisk activity taking banks from causing
systemic crisis. Banks' quest for
maximum profit and shareholders'
value leads to pressure on the bank
management to take excessive risks
and should be discouraged through
setting of limits of risk-taking. The
global financial crisis has
demonstrated that banks' excessive
risk taking can be catastrophic and
that there is no built-in safeguard to
constrain such risk taking.
It is
therefore imperative that regulatory
authorities should set percentage-ofcapital limits on banks' high-risk
activities. The adoption of such limits
is the only tangible way to reduce the
threat to the financial system.
One of the key board responsibilities
is to design compensation programs
that reward long-term performance
and promote sound risk management.
The recent financial crisis revealed
that bank compensation practices
encouraged excessive risk taking and
rewarded short-term profits at the
expense of long-term viability. To
address this deficiency, regulatory
authorities in collaboration with
boards of directors of banks should
establish and adopt prudent
standards for bank compensation
programs that require a significant
portion of bonuses to be paid in shares
that vest over time; link bonuses to
performance targets and adherence
to prudential principles; and permit
bonuses only if supervisors consider a
bank's capital ratios sufficient..
M o r e o v e r,

pursuing

sound

macroeconomic policies is another
way for policymakers to help prevent
banking and financial crises. For
instance, it is beneficial to have sound
and sustainable monetary and fiscal
policy to provide a stable operating
environment for entrepreneurs and
financial institutions and markets.
Many past crises were precipitated
either by an external shock affecting
an already vulnerable financial sector
or by market participants targeting
vulnerabilities in certain markets or in
certain institutions or governments.
Experience has shown that if a
condition or policy looks
unsustainable, it is most likely that
market forces will eventually bring it to
an end.
A major cause of distress in most
Nigerian banks has been attributed to
poor corporate management. In most
cases, members of management are
often self-serving and indulging in
criminally irresponsible behaviour in
the administration of their banks. This
suggests the need for an appropriate
mechanism to be put in place to
ensure that erring directors are
prosecuted on accelerated basis.
Furthermore, having an open and
transparent financial system and
economy, accompanied by reliable
and accurate accounting standards
would generally benefit a country and
its market participants. A core
principle of economics is that markets
are more competitive, and therefore
more efficient, when accurate
information is available to both
consumers and suppliers. Information
is thus critical to the effective
functioning of financial markets:
Timely and accurate financial
information about markets, market
participants, and governments is
important for all actors to be able to
make informed decisions. This is of
course true during normal times, but
perhaps more so during a crisis when
market participants and governments
are sometimes trying to determine
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where problems lie and how severe
they might be. Lack of information can
present additional problems during a
crisis, and incorrect or incomplete
information provided by firms,
governments, and other institutions
can severely undermine their
credibility, worsening the problem.
Transparency will assist banks to
make informed decisions; rescue
them from the illusion of
high
performance; help to build both
customer and investor confidence;
provides opportunity for restrategizing; provides a competitive
advantage, clear understanding of the
risks and challenges facing the bank.
There is need for a forward-looking
supervisory regime which would
ensure appropriate and sustained
capacity building initiatives. Also, bank
supervisors should keep abreast of
state-of-the art practices and
procedures in order to discharge their
functions efficiently, effectively and
creditably.
6.0

Concluding Remarks

We have tried to explain the concepts
involved in banking crisis and
jurisdictional experience in financial
crisis. The causes and the impact of
banking crises on other sector of the
economy were also x-rayed. Some
policy options for a healthy banking
system, including sound
macroeconomic policy, sound risk
management system and high levels
of transparency and disclosure,
among others, were recommended.
As a final thought, there is no uniform
effects neither is there any single
remedy to each crisis, but each brings
its own surprises and risks. Clearly, we
should not assume that past remedies
will fully solve the current and next set
of problems or address all future
crises. The key is to take lessons from
the past and tailor them appropriately
to address future situations of
potential crisis.
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